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the China Point
by John Wood
Extradition orders in the UK and the USA have been contested on 
the basis that it may no longer be possible to receive a fair trial in 
Hong Kong. John Wood argues that the House of Lords and the 
Supreme Court were right to resist this assertion.
H ong Kong is no longer a British Crown Colony. As the world knows, it was handed back to China at midnight on 30 June 1997 and is now a Special Administrative 
Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China. During the last 
few years, much hard work has been put in by many people in 
the UK and the US to put into place extradition treaties 
between those countries and Hong Kong. There is no question, 
at this time, of a treaty with China, but it goes without saying 
that, as China has responsibility for foreign affairs, it needs to be 
consulted and njust give its consent to any arrangements that 
Hong Kong makes with foreign countries.
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
It is perhaps ironic that there now has to be a treaty with the 
UK in view of the pre-handover arrangements: the UK's Fugitive 
Offenders Act 1967 was applied to Hong Kong bv the Fugitive 
Offenders (Hong Kong) Order 1967. From 1 July 1997, these 
provisions no longer have effect, having been replaced, so far as 
the UK is concerned, by the Hong Kong Act 1985 and an Order 
in Council made on 8 April 1997 called the Hong Kong 
(Extradition) Order 1997. The Order is subject to the negative 
resolution procedure but has not yet achieved the force of law. 
So far as Hong Kong is concerned, the Fugitive OJfenders Ordinance 
No. 23 of 1997 was made on 26 May 1997.
The extradition agreement between the UK and Hong Kong 
was submitted to the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group in May 
1997 but, not surprisingly, time was too short for it to be cleared 
by 30 June. The Hong Kong SAR government is pursuing 
clearance with the Chinese government but I find it difficult to 
imagine that the Chinese will raise any objection and the 
agreement should be in force in the not too distant future.
So far as the position between Hong Kong and the US is 
concerned, the Extradition Act 1989 is the primary act. However, 
the relevant treaty - the US and UK treaty dated 8 June 1972 
which was extended to Hong Kong by an exchange of diplomatic
notes on 21 October 1976   was made under previous 
legislation. Whether that agreement remained in force after 30 
June 1997, so far as Hong Kong is concerned, is a matter of 
some contention. There is an extradition agreement between 
the US and Hong Kong signed on 20 December 1996 but it has 
not yet been approved by the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. A hearing has been held but, given the suspicion of 
a number of senators towards China, consent in the near future 
can by no means be guaranteed.
At present, no arrangement is in place between Hong Kong 
and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in relation to the 
surrender of fugitive offenders. Article 95 of the Basic Law of 
Hong Kong   which can loosely be termed the constitution of 
Hong Kong and keeps the pre-handover capitalist system in 
being for the next 50 vears   provides that the Hong Kong 
government may maintain judicial relations with judicial organs 
of other parts of China and that they may render assistance to 
each other.
For some time now, there have been excellent relations and 
close co-operation between Hong Kong and its neighbour, 
Guangdong Province. In view of the ability of some violent 
criminals to cross the border without apparent difficulty, it is 
very important that there should be arrangements in place for 
the mutual surrender of fugitives. Concern has been expressed 
about the possibility that Hong Kong might informally 
surrender to China not only Chinese nationals but also those 
extradited to Hong Kong; but, in view of Hong Kong's history 
and its obedience to the rule of law, this likelihood seems to be 
remote, though it cannot be completely ruled out.
LAUNDER AND LUI
It is proposed to examine the different approaches to 
extradition in courts in the UK and the US by comparing the 
way the House of Lords dealt with the case of R v Home Secretary, 
ex pane Launder [1997] 1 WLR 839 with the way the District
Court for Boston, Massachusetts dealt with the case of Lui Kin- 
Hong v United States Case 96 CV-10849, 24 April 1996. The 
judgment in Lui was appealed by the US Attorney in Boston on 
behalf of the government of Hong Kong.
The facts in each case are only of passing interest. Ewan 
Quayle Launder faces 14 charges of corruption in that it is 
alleged he received the equivalent of about £4m in corrupt 
payments in connection with loans given by Wardley, the 
investment banking company of the Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Bank.
Lui also faces charges of corruption, some ten in all, 
amounting to the equivalent of about £2.5m which it is alleged 
he received whilst employed by British America Tobacco in 
Hong Kong for granting to Giant Island Ltd and associated 
companies a virtual monopoly in respect of the distribution and 
export of certain brands of cigarettes to China and Taiwan. The 
payments were made to overseas bank accounts in Lui's name. 
One of the problems facing the prosecution of Lui is that the 
principal witness against him was abducted, tortured and 
murdered in Singapore.
TWO APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW
Launder's case is unusual in that he has had two bites of the 
cherry. In April 1994, the Bow Street Magistrates' Court 
ordered his return to Hong Kong. An application for habeas 
corpus was refused by the Divisional Court in December 1994 
and in March 1995, the House of Lords refused leave to appeal. 
Following normal procedure, after reviewing the case, the 
Home Secretary decided that Launder should be surrendered to 
Hong Kong. This was in July 1995.
In December 1995 and January 1996, Launder obtained 
leave from the Divisional Court to judicially review the Home 
Secretary's decision and on 6 August 1996, he was successful on 
the somewhat novel basis that the Home Secretary had not 
personally directed his mind to the issue but had felt himself 
bound by the decision of the Cabinet on what has now become 
known as the 'China Point'. In this case the Divisional Court was 
not giving credence to the 'China Point' but was merely saying 
that the case should be considered again as the Home Secretary 
had not exercised his own independent judgment.
WHAT IS THE 'CHINA POINT'?
The 'China Point' is not novel, having been taken in courts in 
the US and the UK, for example in R v Governor ofBrixton Prison, 
ex pane Osman (No. 3) [1992] 1 WLR 36. Expressed in simple 
terms, the 'China Point' is that after 30 June 1997 there can be 
no guarantee that a fugitive criminal   or anyone else for that 
matter   would receive a fair trial in Hong Kong; that, if
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convicted, he would be in danger of being inflicted with cruel
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and inhuman punishment; and, furthermore, that there is 
nothing to stop China demanding his surrender and Hong Kong 
complying. The Hong Kong courts feel outraged at the 
suggestion that fair trials will be things of the past and the 
Correctional Services Department, which has an excellent 
reputation, far better than that of many places elsewhere, feels 
equal outrage.
APPEAL TO THE LORDS
The Home Secretary appealed against the decision in 
Launder's favour, arguing that the Divisional Court had
misunderstood the evidence and affirming that he had exercised 
his own independent judgment. That point was speedily decided 
but, over several days, the House of Lords heard submissions on 
the 'China Point', ultimately allowing the Home Secretary's 
appeal and dismissing the applications for judicial review.
In criminal cases nowadays, the House of Lords often gives 
only one judgment   much to the relief of practitioners who will 
be grateful to Lord Hope of Craighead who deals with a 
multitude of difficult submissions with admirable clarity.
The House of Lords recognised that the supreme judicial 
authority was to remain in Hong Kong after the handover. The 
transfer of sovereignty was to create unique problems because 
there was not the slightest possibility that the trial could take 
place whilst Hong Kong was under British rule.
One of the greatest problems at present is that no one really 
knows what is going to happen in Hong Kong. Reliance can be 
placed only in the careful and extensive arrangements that have 
been put into place by the Basic Law and by the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, a document 
of some length which has the status of a treaty and which has 
been registered with the United Nations Organisation. It was 
ratified by the UK on 27 May 1985.
The Joint Declaration is an exceptionally important 
document. Paragraph 3(3) states that the laws currently in force 
in Hong Kong shall remain unchanged and in its elaboration of
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its basic policies regarding Hong Kong (see para. Ill, marginal 
notes 58 69), the government of China states that the judicial 
system previously practised in Hong Kong shall remain 
unchanged, that the courts shall be independent and free from 
interference and that the power of final judgment shall be vested 
in the newly created Court of Final Appeal. The prosecuting 
authority will control criminal prosecutions free from 
interference. From what I have learned, the only change has 
been to the authority's name: the Attorney General's Chambers 
is now the Department of Justice.
TRUSTING CHINA
In his speech, Lord Hope said:
'The question whether it is unjust or oppressive to order the applicant's 
return to Hong Kong must in the end depend upon whether the PRC can 
be trusted in the implementation of its treaty obligations to respect his 
fundamental human rights, allow him a fair trial and leave it to the 
courts, if he is convicted, to determine the appropriate punishment.' R v 
Home Secretary, ex parte Launder [1997] 1 WLR 839 at p. 857B.
What is there to suggest China will exert its influence upon
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Hong Kong to, in effect, jettison the rule of law? And it has to 
be remembered that it is the courts of Hong Kong which will
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make the decisions, courts with judges who were appointed 
under British rule, brought up in the common law system and 
with not the slightest suspicion against them that they are likely 
to depart from the high standards of fairness and integrity they 
enjoy. Why should China jeopardise the continued commercial 
success of Hong Kong in this way? The reality is that it will not 
and, furthermore, it is difficult to see why it would do so in a 
corruption case that goes to the integrity of the business 
community and has nothing in the way of political ramifications. 
One is entitled to ask why the UK and US governments have 
agreed treaty obligations if they seriously doubted that the rule
of law in Hong Kong would be overcome by communist 
philosophy and dogma.
Launder has taken his case to the European Commission of 
Human Rights which has asked the Home Secretary for his 
observations. The new Home Secretary in the Labour 
government has invited Launder to make further submissions. 
With respect, if those submissions succeed on the basis that the 
Hong Kong courts and administration cannot be trusted, it 
seems pointless to enter into a treaty as extradition would 
become a dead letter.
THE APPROACH IN LUI
On 20 December 1995, Lui was arrested in Boston for the 
purpose of extraditing him to Hong Kong and after several court 
hearings was ordered to remain in custody pending an 
extradition hearing. After a three day hearing, a magistrate 
found that the evidence justified the extradition of Lui and so 
certified on 20 August 1996. A few days later Lui filed for a writ 
of habeas corpus.
The application was heard in the Boston Federal District 
Court which, on 7 January 1997, upheld Lui's appeal and 
granted the writ.
The approach of Judge Joseph Tauro in the District Court was 
quite unlike that of the Divisional Court and the House of 
Lords. He, rightly, came to the view that the chances of trying
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Lui before 1 July 1997 were so remote as to be discounted and 
therefore concluded that, at the time of his trial, Lui would be 
in the custody of China, not of the UK. China could try Lui 
before the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region. If found guilty, Lui would be punished not by the Crown 
Colony of Hong Kong or the UK but by China.
This is a breathtaking assertion. There is not a word about the 
Joint Declaration or the Basic Law. Nor is there a mention of the 
concept of 'one country, two systems' or any reference to those 
paragraphs in the Joint Declaration about the independence of 
Hong Kong's judges. There is just a bald statement that, after 
the handover, Hong Kong's judges would be employed by China 
even though China had responsibility only for foreign affairs and 
defence. The US Attorney on behalf of the US and Hong Kong 
had, in fact, submitted that the court lacked jurisdiction to 
examine the reality of whether Hong Kong would be competent 
to satisfy its treaty obligations but the District Court took the 
contrary view.
Judge Tauro said that the language of the treaty' between the 
UK and the US itself prohibited extradition if Hong Kong, as 
the Crown colony, was unable to try and punish Lui. He went 
on to assert that the legislative history during the ratification 
process confirmed this view. Of course, in English courts it is 
rare to discuss what occurred in the legislative process and, so 
far as I am aware, it has not been done in an extradition case. 
The point made by the judge was that, in its ratification hearings 
of a narrower political offence provision in the UK/US treaty, 
which was brought in to enable terrorists to be extradited more 
easily, a number of senators expressed concern about judicial 
processes in the UK and that such ratification would not have 
been made if the treaty provisions could be extended to China.
HONG KONG POLICY ACT
It remains only to mention the Hon? Kong Policy Act passed
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by Congress in 1992 which states:
'For all purposes, including actions in any Court in the US, the 
Congress approves the continuation in force on and after 1st July ]997 
of all treaties, and other international agreements including multilateral 
conventions entered into before such date between the US and Hong 
Kong, or entered into before such date between the US and the UK unless 
or until terminated in accordance with the law. '
During the passage of the Act in the Congress, a senior 
government lawyer stated:
'On extradition we are now negotiating with the Hong Kong 
government on a new treaty to replace the existing US/UK agreement, 
which would continue in force after the reversion to China. '
Although this is slightly ambiguous it does appear that the 
speaker took the view that the treaty as it applied to Hong Kong 
was to continue. Given the terms of the Hong Kong Policy Act 
and this statement, it comes as something of a surprise that the 
US Attorney made the concession that, in the absence of any 
action by the President or the Congress, the existing 
arrangements lapsed. The argument put forward was that if 
Congress had intended that the existing treaty did not permit 
extradition before the handover, it would have been expected 
that a Congressman would have raised this issue. Not 
surprisingly, Judge Tauro was most unimpressed with this 
argument. It is interesting that in Oen Yin-Choy 858 F 2nd 400 
(9th Circuit 1988) the court rejected the contention that Hong 
Kong's reversion acted as extradition to China but the judge 
chose not to follow that as the case was heard some eight years 
before and trial and sentence would be complete before 1997.
It is hardly a surprise that the US government appealed to the 
Federal Court of Appeal for the first circuit. The court held 
there was a valid treaty in existence, that sufficient evidence to 
extradite had been adduced and that the matters raised by Lui 
concerning his rights and protection should he be returned to 
Hong Kong were a matter for the Secretary of State for the State 
Department and not the court. An application to the Supreme 
Court for leave to appeal was refused and Lui returned to Hong 
Kong on 22 May 1997.
CONCLUSION
These cases illustrate fundamental differences in the approach 
to extradition to Hong Kong prior to the handover although, 
perhaps, the House of Lords and the Federal Court of Appeal 
are not so far apart. It now remains to see what happens to the 
draft treaties. They are important, especially for the US.
Over the last few years, there has been considerable 
extradition traffic between Hong Kong and the US especially in 
relation to drugs and there have been some substantial fraud 
cases where Hong Kong has sought extradition from the UK. 
What is certain is that neither the US nor the UK will wish to 
become safe havens for Hong Kong criminals. ©
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